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On October 13, 1829, as delegates to the Virginia constitutional convention were 
beginning the work of drafting a new state constitution, a group of citizens excluded from the 
convention petitioned the delegates, arguing that the state’s restricted franchise was unfair and 
unjust.  It vested in “a favored class, not in consideration of their public services, but of their 
private possessions, the highest of all privileges: one which, as is now in flagrant proof, if it does 
not constitute, at least is held, practically to confer absolute sovereignty.” They argued that the 
existing constitutional requirements of freehold suffrage were inconsistent with the basic premise 
of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, the equality of all white men under natural law, and with 
the republican principle of majority rule.1    
The members of this group, the non-freeholders of Richmond, were prohibited from 
voting under the existing 1776 constitution and appealed to the convention for an extension of 
suffrage. At the time the 1776 constitution was ratified, a majority of its framers held traditional 
English beliefs about the nature of political power and the franchise, arguing that property 
ownership was the best way to ensure that voters had “permanent common interest with, and 
attachment to the community.” As a result, the Virginia constitution of 1776 continued colonial 
suffrage requirements, restricting the right to vote to free white men who owned a freehold: at 
least fifty acres of unimproved land, twenty-five acres of land with a plantation and house of at 
least twelve square feet or a town lot with a house of at least twelve square feet.  The non-
freeholders argued that in addition to violating natural law, it was axiomatic that virtue, 
intelligence, and patriotism could not be equated with property ownership. They were essentially 
making the case for a broader conception of attachment to the community:  property was only 
one of a number of ways to signify attachment.  Attachment could and should also be defined by 
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virtue, demonstrated by obeying the law; intelligence, demonstrated through productivity; and 
patriotism, demonstrated by loyalty to the state.  
Because the non-freeholders could not participate in the proceedings, delegate John 
Marshall presented their memorial. Marshall, the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, was 
born in Fauquier County, Virginia in 1755 and, after serving as an officer in the Revolutionary 
War, had become a fixture of Virginia and national politics.  He had been active in Virginia’s 
efforts to ratify the U.S. Constitution, and he had served as a member of the Virginia House of 
Delegates as well as U.S. Secretary of State. He was appointed Chief Justice in 1801 by 
President John Adams, and although he still held  that position in 1829, he agreed to serve as a 
delegate to the Virginia constitutional convention. At the memorial’s conclusion, Marshall 
indicated the potential for reform when he stated that the subject was one of the “deepest 
interest” that should receive “the most serious attention” of the convention.2 
The non-freeholders’ memorial highlights several important developments in nineteenth 
century constitutional thinking.  First, the non-freeholders rejected the idea that the social 
compact out of which state governments were formed during the Revolutionary era was based 
exclusively on the protection of private property.  They challenged the notion that only the 
largest and wealthiest landowners possessed sufficient attachment to their communities to be 
accorded political rights.  Instead, they reconceived attachment to include public service.  They 
argued that non-property owners also deserved political rights because they provided duties that 
benefitted the entire community: they were taxpayers who contributed to public financing of 
infrastructure and defense, militiamen who had fought in the Revolutionary War and the War of 
1812 and who were still called upon to ensure domestic order and defend against slave revolts, 
and house-keeper, whose productivity was necessary to the economic well-being of their 
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communities and whose patriarchal control over other family members (women, children, and, in 
some cases, slaves) helped to maintain social order and economic well-being.  They articulated a 
new and compelling position for their inclusion into the state polity: they were free white men of 
value to the elite planter class because they maintained social order by insuring that disorderly 
men and women, especially rebellious slaves, were kept at bay. 
The Freeholders articulated a broader definition of attachment, one that was being echoed 
in states across the country during the nineteenth century. In many instances, this debate over 
how to define attachment became one of the key issues at state constitutional conventions 
because it was so closely tied to issues of suffrage and representation. This thesis examines the 
debate in four state constitutional conventions: Massachusetts in 1820, Virginia in 1830-1831, 
Pennsylvania in 1837-1838, and Texas in 1845. By focusing on three of the original thirteen 
states, all of which initially drafted state constitutions during the Revolution and then revised 
them between 1820 and 1838, I illustrate the ways in which distinct political cultures shaped the 
definition of attachment in each state and how that definition changed over time. The inclusion 
of Texas, which was admitted to the United States in 1845, adds geographic variety, a more 
diverse (i.e., non-English) colonial experience, and an expanded time frame. 
I have created a braided narrative that is organized thematically as opposed to 
chronologically.  The introduction illustrates the historical context that made attachment a central 
issue in nineteenth century constitutional revision, both at the national and state levels. The body 
of the text is divided into two chapters organized around the new conceptions of attachment that 
emerged in the constitutional conventions of the four states: the first chapter examines 
attachment as both affection for one’s community and as virtue, and the second chapter examines 
attachment as a form of public service and as a way of protecting types of property other than 
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real property.  Using this braided technique highlights the ways in which different states 
grappled with the same pressures to redefine attachment ways that allowed the participation of 
upwardly mobile non-elite white men in the polity but still excluded potentially dangerous 
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This thesis examines the changing conception of attachment in state constitutional 
conventions from 1820 – 1845.  During the colonial and early national periods, attachment was 
defined primarily through property ownership.  Accordingly, early state constitutions limited the  
rights of citizenship, namely suffrage, to free white men who possessed a freehold.  Over time, in 
response to pressure from upwardly mobile white males, state constitutional conventions began 
to create a new political order based on an expanded definition of attachment: non-propertied 




The Richmond memorial illustrates the belief of many citizens of the nineteenth century 
that the political promises of the American Revolution had not yet been fulfilled, especially as 
they related to suffrage and representation.  As the original thirteen states contemplated revisions 
of state constitutions, and as new states entering the Union drafted their first constitutions, 
political pressures from both elites and non-elites led to conflicts over the appropriate meaning of 
attachment.  In many instances, this manifested itself in the debate over whether and how 
suffrage would be expanded and how representation in state legislatures would be apportioned: 
Would the right to vote be based on a broader definition of citizenship than property ownership? 
Would legislative seats be apportioned based on population, taxation, or some combination of 
the two? Essentially, the debate was over how attachment to one’s community would be defined. 
In some instances, citizens took advantage of ideological differences among competing groups of 
political elites to pressure reform-minded elites to make state constitutions more responsive to 
their concerns. Reformers believed they were engaged in activities “favorable to the cause of 
republicanism,” pushing political leaders to match government institutions to the rhetoric of a 
republican form of government. However, in other cases, delegates opposed to reform were able 
to prevent the changes citizens had been advocating.1 
While the delegates to constitutional conventions tended to be political elites, citizens did 
not always defer to those elites; they expressed their opinions in directions and memorials to 
their representatives, through newspapers, and in letters. These written records shatter the myth 
of a unified population or a population whose political views remained fixed over time.  Instead, 
they present a dynamic population whose views about acceptable levels of civic engagement in 
government institutions were changing over time.  Essentially, many of them wanted their state 
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constitutions to reflect the beliefs that ownership of real property was not the only marker of 
attachment to one’s community nor the only determinate of the rights of suffrage and political 
representation.   
The traditional progressive narrative of American history often describes this shift 
towards universal suffrage as uninform and linear; beginning with the Revolution, the United 
States was on a clear trajectory to becoming a true democracy by the end of Jackson’s Age of the 
Common Man.  However, this view presents an oversimplified version of the past and ignores 
the founders’ belief that they were creating a republic, not a democracy. At the time of the 
Revolution, democracy was commonly associated with faction and mob rule, creating 
“instability, injustice, and confusion.” In Federalist No. 10, Publius (in this instance, Virginian 
James Madison) reflected the common belief that democratic governments “have in general been 
as short in their lives as violent in their deaths.”  Accordingly, most American political elites 
preferred a republican form of government in which a majority of the citizens delegated authority 
to a smaller number of elected officials who in turn carried out the business of governing.  This 
form of government was, many believed, more effective at curtailing the deleterious impacts of 
faction.  A republic, they believed, would help to check competing interests among society.  
Instead of a democracy, then, most political elites of the time worked, at the national and state 
levels, to create a republic of free white men.2  
Despite the framers’ preference for a republican form of government rather than a 
democratic one, in the years following the Revolution, new ways of talking about and practicing 
democracy began to emerge. First, as early as the 1780s, during the ratification debate over the 
federal Constitution, opposition to the document reflected class-consciousness.  In his analysis of 
anti-federalist rhetoric, historian Saul Cornell developed the term plebian anti-federalist to 
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describe those authors who portrayed themselves as spokesmen of the common people, either by 
virtue of their close connection to the people or by their own status as “common folk.”  In 
adopting the term “plebian,” Cornell tied these authors to the non-elites of ancient Rome who 
successfully gained political rights for themselves. Many of the plebian anti-federalists called 
attention to the important role militiamen, most of whom were not property-owning elites, had 
played in the success of the Revolution but who would be hurt, antifederalists argued, by the 
ratification of the Constitution. Second, in Massachusetts, local government centered around the 
town meeting, an example of direct democracy, in which all citizens had the opportunity to voice 
their opinions about the issues and then vote on outcomes. Third, during the 1790s, democratic 
clubs and societies began to emerge; they offered non-elites, like farmers, artisans, and 
mechanics, an opportunity to discuss contemporary political issues, sometimes along with 
elected officials and landed elites, and they challenged the prevailing idea of “an electorate at a 
safe remove from their representatives.”  Similarly, elected officials changed the language they 
used to describe the American political system; for example, in his 1825 inaugural address, John 
Quincy Adams identified the United States as a “confederated representative democracy” rather 
than a republic. Finally, during the presidency of Andrew Jackson, opposition to Indian removal 
was so strong that it “overwhelmed traditional forms of political participation” and led to 
petitions signed by male voters as well as by college students and women.3 
The preceding examples make it clear that the notion of who should be allowed to 
participate in politics and what forms those activities should take were changing.  It was a time 
of transition, when politics was becoming more participatory, largely due to the development of 
the second party system, where Federalists and Democratic-Republicans competed for the 
allegiance of voters.  As part of this competition, political elites in both parties worked to create 
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the illusion of shared interests with the growing middle class population. The middle class, in 
turn, began to expect that their increasing involvement in the new market economy should 
translate into a greater share of political power. This expectation provided an opening for a new 
political order based on expanded political rights at state constitutional conventions: one in 
which some upwardly mobile white men redefined attachment to the community in a way that 
would allow them access to the vote and officeholding.4  
However, many nineteenth century Americans still did not define democracy the way 
present-day Americans do, as a government based on the principles of majority rule and 
universal suffrage.  The experiences of the drafters of state constitutions in Massachusetts, 
Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Texas are representative of the conflicts drafters of other state 
constitutions faced and the compromises they had to make in determining how to define 
attachment and how to reconcile ideas of natural rights with traditional British ideas of social 
class and the privilege and deference built into it. Members of the political elite of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century were heavily influenced by John Locke’s theory of social contract based 
on natural rights.  According to Locke, governments formed when individuals surrendered their 
natural rights to life, liberty, and property in exchange for civil rights created and issued by the 
state; these civil rights would ensure the civic order and the protection of private property.5   
In the years leading up to the Revolution, some members of the colonial elite had begun 
to emphasize Locke’s language of liberty and natural rights in an attempt to sway public opinion 
towards Revolution.  Thus Americans of all social classes became familiar with the language of 
natural rights. However, as historian Michal Jan Rozbicki notes, elites’ conception of liberty was 
based on a British ideological framework with privilege at its center, and they defined liberty not 
as an abstract right, but as a “cluster of specific immunities and entitlements existing along a 
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continuum with different portions of the spectrum available to different social ranks and with the 
fullest enjoyment exclusive to the uppermost elites.”  These entitlements included habeas 
corpus, trial by jury, representative government, and franchise.  Importantly, they saw liberty as 
what Rozbicki calls a “relation of difference” based on an assumed social inequality and 
deference, and most elites saw no problem basing attachment on property and restricting the 
franchise to property-owning white males.6  
One of the ways the elite exercised their power was through their ability to define and 
control the public meaning of liberty through rhetoric.  This new Revolutionary era rhetoric, 
though employing the language of rights and liberties, was built on existing inequalities and 
perpetuated the former colonial elite’s self-interest. Property was the primary marker used by 
elites to differentiate status and restrict access to government power. The earliest state 
constitutions reflected this self-interest; despite the Revolutionary era’s emphasis on rights and 
liberties, most states equated attachment with property; accordingly, they instituted property 
restrictions for voting and office-holding, and legislative representation was not apportioned by 
population but by other means that privileged wealth over population.  This framework allowed 
political elites to maintain the power they held during colonial times.7  
Property requirements in the early republic reflected the traditional British beliefs that the 
right to vote required independence and that independence could only be secured through 
property ownership; men who did not own property were dependent on others and could not be 
trusted with the franchise. Many American political elites had been influenced by the British 
jurist Sir William Blackstone’s argument that the “true reason of requiring any qualification with 
regard to property in voters is to exclude such persons as are in so mean a situation that they are 
esteemed to have no will of their own.” The views of John Adams were typical of many of 
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political elites of the time: “[V]ery few Men, who have no Property, have any Judgment of their 
own. They talk and vote as they are directed by Some Man of Property, who has attached their 
Minds to his Interest.”  Adams believed that this idea of dependence, or a lack of judgement, 
extended not only to men who did not own property but also to women and children, despite the 
desire of his wife, Abigail, that women be given political rights.8  
Abel Upshur, a delegate to the 1829-30 Virginia convention, echoed Blackstone’s 
argument that basing political rights in property promoted social stability.  Born into the Virginia 
elite, Upshur’s family owned a plantation in Northampton County, Virginia, and before attending 
the constitutional convention, he served as a member of the Virginia House of Delegates and as a 
member of the Virginia General Court. In the 1840s, he served in the cabinet of President John 
Tyler, a fellow Virginian. Upshur articulated the widespread view that if men without property 
were given the right to vote, corruption and anarchy would follow. Harkening back to the class 
warfare and violence of the French Revolution, and signaling the fear many slave-owning 
Virginians felt about the possibility of slave revolts, he argued that without protection of 
property rights, “our next business is to cut each other’s throats.”9 
While Upshur’s statement is clearly hyperbolic, the view that protection of property was 
essential to a well-ordered society was so widespread and deeply held, even after the Revolution, 
that many state constitutions, including those of Virginia and Massachusetts, limited the 
franchise to property-owners.  This fusion of the right to vote with property ownership led to the 
development of a political and social system built on the deference of the majority to a minority 
of the propertied elite (including, in Virginia, Upshur). This system, in turn, created societies 
with pronounced class divisions.  Over time, history has shown that such societies eventually 
suffered from political and social instability and often were not able to maintain and protect the 
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rights of the majority, but in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, these societies 
were the norm in the western world.10 
However, despite the deferential political system that existed in the decades following the 
Revolution, new ways of speaking about democracy had begun to emerge. In an attempt to gain 
support for their campaign against British tyranny, elites had appealed to non-elites through 
public speeches and in print, thereby spreading the more inclusive language of liberty to non-
elites, and as a result, the “symbolic use of language merged with the practical and political 
functions to such an extent that separating them was difficult, if not impossible.”  Although 
many of the first state constitutions which had been drafted in the immediate aftermath of the 
Declaration of Independence adopted this rhetoric of rights, they also simultaneously reflected 
those traditional British ideas of liberty, and they restricted suffrage and representation 
accordingly. However, once upwardly mobile non-elites became exposed to the language of 
liberty, they began to expect that it would apply to them as well as to the elites, and they started 
to pressure political elites to make institutions more responsive to the public, largely by 
challenging possession of real property as the only sufficient marker of attachment to one’s 
community. They were most successful in those situations where elites were divided over the 
appropriate level of civic engagement and participation in state governments and in states where 
the traditional political culture valued public service as much as property ownership.11 
One of the ways reformers were successful in limiting the role of property as a marker of 
attachment was to reframe the definition of citizenship, equating it with civic engagement and 
stressing the exchange of rights for duties or obligations. In doing so, they expanded the 
definition of attachment to encompass contributing to the good of society in a variety of ways, 
including militia service, tax-paying, and house-keeping.  In defining these new markers of 
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attachment, reformers stressed the shared interests and values of patriotism, virtue, social order, 
and productivity. These ideas were resonant in part because they were not new to American 
political thought or discourse.  Instead, they built on existing notions of attachment: the idea of 
American states as  commonwealths, the role of institutions like schools, churches, and militias, 
and the importance of connection to the land.12 
At Independence, three American states, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, 
borrowed from the English tradition and called themselves commonwealths, acknowledging that 
they were founded to promote the common good.  Adopting the identifier commonwealth 
signaled the role of the state in promoting the interests of all citizens and, importantly, 
encouraging what historian Johann Neem calls “affectionate ties,” or feelings of shared 
experiences and values. Commonwealths stressed the social contract and the exchange of rights 
for obligations, but at the same time, de-emphasized individual rights while privileging 
communal interests.  To create these affectionate ties, some states relied on institutions.  In 
Massachusetts, for example, the 1780 constitution provided for both a system of public education 
and public support of churches. Pennsylvania’s sizeable Quaker population shared a belief in the 
interconnectedness of individuals and God, which led to an emphasis on moral ties that bound all 
members of the commonwealth in mutual responsibility, and the Pennsylvania constitution also 
supported education. In Virginia, many inhabitants shared Thomas Jefferson’s agrarian vision of 
society in which love of and connection to one’s soil translated to a love of one’s country. One 
delegate to the constitutional convention of 1829-1830 went so far as to describe farmers as the 
“chosen people of God,” and argued that as such, they should be awarded a special status within 
society.13    
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Despite their shared status as commonwealths, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and 
Virginia had distinct social and political cultures, and these differences meant that each state’s 
original constitutions as well as their paths to redefining attachment and who contributed to the 
good of the state were distinct.  The centrality of the Puritan tradition in Massachusetts and its 
emphasis on church membership and participation translated into a political culture in which 
civic participation was “sanctioned, encouraged, and seized upon” in ways distinct from other 
states. In Pennsylvania, Quakers supported education not only for white males but also for 
women and free African Americans, a unique position at the time.  Virginia, the commonwealth 
most dependent on unfree labor, became consumed with concerns about potential slave 
rebellions and a potential increase in the number of free African Americans as a result of 
widespread manumission or emancipation.14  
In each of these states, constitutional conventions provided opportunities for debate, and 
although the states had distinct political cultures, certain key issues emerged in common.  First, 
many delegates began to argue that virtue and civic value should be measured by public service, 
rather than strictly by property ownership.  Second, property ownership itself should be more 
broadly defined beyond just real property; it could and should include the homestead or the 
house-keeper.  Third, patriotic attachment was important and should be valued; it could be 
created through public education, militia service, or family headship. Fourth, some advocates for 
expanded definitions of attachment and wider suffrage took the pragmatic position that allowing 
more men to vote would prevent disaffection among groups in the population most likely to 
engage in mob violence.  Finally, while many political elites saw a value in widening the 
definition of attachment and easing suffrage restrictions, they were wary of true equality; 
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expanding white male suffrage happened alongside new legal restrictions for groups framers 
considered dangerous to social stability, including women and free African Americans.  
By 1815, many states began to seriously consider constitutional revision for a number of 
reasons.  First, the conclusion of the War of 1812 shifted the nation’s attention from foreign to 
domestic affairs.  Additionally, the war effort depended on militias, many of whose members 
were not eligible to vote because they did not meet their states’ property requirements.  At the 
same time, as historian Alan Taylor argues, the war effort called attention to the differences 
between British subjectship and American citizenship, indirectly highlighting the meanings of 
citizenship, patriotism, and attachment to one’s nation. Furthermore, the militia’s role in the war 
and in promoting domestic order gave it and its members legitimacy and authority which in turn 
signified attachment to one’s community distinct from property ownership.  Finally, militia 
activities, including public parades and roll calls were important civic rituals which also created 
attachment to political life of one’s community.15 
Fear of domestic insurrection was another factor that contributed to constitutional 
revision in multiple states. Mob culture predated the Revolution, with colonial and early national 
political leaders tolerating a certain amount of “politics outside,” provided the mobs limited the 
damage inflicted upon persons and property. However, the increasing frequency and intensity of 
mob violence of the early nineteenth century called attention to new levels of internal conflict, 
and political elites at the national and state levels began to see the need to strengthen the power 
of the government in order to prevent disorder. Many mob actions had economic roots, and some 
elites became concerned that if the government did not expand its power over economic issues, 
mob violence would continue to grow in frequency and intensity. For example, Shays’ Rebellion 
in the backcountry of Massachusetts is widely acknowledged to be one of the precipitating 
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events of the drafting of the U.S. Constitution because elites realized the government under the 
Articles of Confederation was not strong enough to maintain order or to protect elite economic 
interests. Furthermore, some elites began to believe that extending political rights to wider 
swaths of the population would help to create feelings of attachment and common interest among 
men who might otherwise join mob action. Ironically, mob action and rebellion could 
occasionally be used by elites to achieve their goals; for example, the Republic of Texas was 
created through filibuster by native-born Americans against Mexico.16 
At the same time, economic changes as a result of rapid industrialization and the effects 
of the War of 1812 led to the Panic of 1819, and the crisis forced national and state governments 
to consider increasing their roles in managing the economy.  In the aftermath of the war, the 
nascent textile industry and the farmers who supplied it with cotton experienced huge 
contractions as government demand decreased and British goods flooded the market. 
Bankruptcies skyrocketed. Banks began to call in outstanding loans, leading to a contraction in 
the money supply, which caused financial hardship at all levels of society. As a result of the 
crisis, political elites at the state and national levels began to debate with great frequency issues 
such as protective tariffs, debtor relief, and bank charters.  Because these issues directly reflected 
the power of the state, many of them spilled over into state constitutional conventions.17  
Americans were also developing a more democratic temperament based on feelings of 
sympathy towards and commonality with others. This new sensibility had its roots in the Scottish 
Enlightenment, among thinkers such as David Hume and Adam Smith who emphasized 
politeness, sociability, and an interdependency that encouraged social action.  This social action 
led to feelings of attachment to one’s community, which in turn had the effect of making 
concrete and “humanizing the abstract notion of ‘the people.’” The resulting “imagined 
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community” existed even when a political community was too large for all of its members to 
know each other, because “in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” In other 
words, attachment to one’s community could exist through feelings and sentiment rather than 
through property.18  
Demographic changes  in the early nineteenth made the “errors” of the Revolutionary-era 
constitutions clearly obvious; specifically, as the Atlantic states’ populations shifted west, 
political power remained concentrated along the east coast, creating tensions between easterners 
attempting to maintain their hold on power and westerners fighting to gain the political power to 
which they believed they were entitled. This was an especially salient issue in Virginia, where 
regional differences were exacerbated by the issue of slavery. Eastern slave-holders dominated 
the state legislature and had been resisting calls for change in legislative apportionment since 
1776.  Finally, the constitutions of new states entering the union “registered important 
democratic gains” of which citizens in the original states were aware.  Many residents of eastern 
states began to migrate west for greater economic and political opportunities. Accordingly, 
political elites in many of the original thirteen states began to feel pressure to revise their 
constitutions, especially as they related to attachment and suffrage.19 
 At each convention, delegates debated the issues involved in framing state governments, 
but some delegates took on greater roles than others.  In each state, a few key figures laid out 
ideological positions and set the parameters for debate on the issue of how to define attachment 
and the corresponding rights that went with it.  In Massachusetts, partisan identity meant less 
than whether one supported a broad or a narrow view of attachment.  Josiah Quincy, a Federalist 
with extensive political experience and Machiavellian-like organizational skills created an 
alliance with Democratic-Republican and sitting justice of the U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
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Joseph Story to block efforts by reformers to expand suffrage and create more a more equitable 
system of representation. Other important figures included the famed orator Daniel Webster.20 
 At the Pennsylvania convention, Thomas Earle, a Quaker active in a variety of reform 
movements, including abolition, became known as the “Father of the Constitution of 1828” for 
his work in changing the framework of government.  He remained committed to abolition and  
ran for vice president of the United States on the Liberty Party ticket in 1840. Thaddeus Stevens, 
another abolitionist and future Radical Republican in the U.S. House of Representatives during 
Reconstruction, advocated for public education and equality before the law for all men, 
regardless of race. These issues were central to his activism because he believed distinctions 
based on class and race were incompatible with republican governments.21 
 Although Thomas Jefferson did not attend a Virginia constitutional convention during his 
lifetime, his influence was strong at both the conventions of 1776 and 1829-1830.  James 
Madison attended both conventions, playing a leading role. The 1829-1830 convention boasted a 
who’s who of American politics, including John Marshall and James Monroe. There were also 
delegates not as well-known on the national stage but who were key figures in Richmond, 
including Alexander Campbell. A native of Scotland, he was an ordained minister and outspoken 
advocate for the western part of the state.  Benjamin Watkins Leigh, a delegate from Richmond, 
was a well-known attorney and political figure.  He played an active role in making sure 
delegates opposed to reform remained unified in their positions.22  
 In Texas, many leaders of the convention of 1845 had been active in the Texan 
revolution, including Isaac VanZandt. VanZandt, a native of Tennessee, moved to Texas in 1838 
and quickly became involved in politics. Sam Houston appointed him to the position of chargé 
d’affairs to the United States in 1845, where he successfully worked for the annexation of Texas.  
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Once that was secured, he returned to Texas to serve as a delegate to the constitutional 
convention. José Antonio Navarro, the only Hispanic delegate to the convention, had served in 
the Coahuila and Texas state legislature and the Mexican federal congress prior to Texas’s 
independence. He signed the Texas Declaration of Independence in 1836, and at the 
constitutional convention in 1845, he worked to protect the rights of Tejanos.23 
Under these changing circumstances, and with the aforementioned key figures playing 
important roles, the debate over the evolving nature of attachment and the appropriate role of 
property in ordering early American society came to the fore.  However, this pressure for states 
to redefine attachment through constitutional revision did not unfurl in a uniform or even linear 
way.  This thesis examines the contested nature of these debates in four states: Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Texas. The first three states drafted their initial constitutions during 
the Revolutionary War and then subsequently revised them between 1820 and 1838.  Texas 
drafted its first constitution in 1836 after declaring independence from Mexico, drawing parallels 
to American independence from Britain, and then drafted another constitution in 1845-46 as a 
part of its annexation by the United States.  By focusing on these four states, I am able to trace 
the development of theories of attachment over time and in different regions, among slave and 
non-slave states.  However, change was limited; no state entirely removed property 
qualifications, and as suffrage moved closer to universal white male suffrage, states imposed 
new limits on other groups, including women and free African Americans. While the details 
differ across the four states, they all illustrate the fact that state constitutional conventions and 
the resulting documents they produced reflected the debate over “competing and infinitely 
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ATTACHMENT AS A CONSTITUTINAL ISSUE:  
THE POLITICS OF AFFECTION AND VIRTUE 
 
 In a letter to Samuel Kercheval from July, 1816, Thomas Jefferson argued in favor of 
revising the 1776 Virginia constitution because it did not conform to republican principles, and it 
failed to “embody the will of [the] people.” His primary concern was its unequal representation. 
Because attachment was based on the freehold, it prevented a large population of white men 
from voting, even though they were otherwise attached to their community. He argued 
attachment should be defined by either military service or taxpaying.  Accordingly, suffrage 
should be extended to “every man who fights or pays.” This concern was not new to Jefferson; in 
a letter to Edmund Pendleton written during the ratification debate of the state constitution of 
1776, he objected to the constitution’s narrow definition of attachment as the freehold.  He 
argued that it should be broadly construed as permanent intention of living in the country and 
could be proven any number of ways, including “having resided a certain time, or having a 
family, or having property, any or all of them.”1 
While both of these letters expressed Jefferson’s frustration with specific provisions of 
the 1776 Virginia state constitution, they are representative of the concerns of reformers across 
the United States in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  In a number of states, 
delegates to constitutional conventions grappled with how to define attachment in a way that 
would serve as both a positive good and as a means of social control. Many delegates concluded 
that in order to do so, the obligation of attachment and its corresponding right of suffrage would 
have to expand beyond the ownership of real property.  They determined five new and important 
ways to approach and reframe attachment: first, as the embodiment of social affection and virtue; 
second, as a solution for containing rebellions; third, as a reward for public service; fourth, as a 
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way to reinforce the need to protect new forms of property, especially slavery; and finally, as a 
politically charged symbol for restricting the rights and  suffrage of dangerous and dependent 
classes of people, such as white women and free African Americans. 
Massachusetts was one of the first states to grapple with constitutional revision in the 
nineteenth century.  The constitution of 1780 had established the precedent of constituent 
sovereignty, the idea that constitutions should be framed in specially-called conventions and then 
ratified by the people.  It was an important political principle that distinguished the new 
republican state governments from their colonial predecessors. State constitutions were not 
ordinary legislation, appropriate for state legislatures to handle in the normal course of business. 
As frameworks of new state governments, constitutions required, according to adherents of the 
theory, a convention dedicated to their creation whose delegates had been expressly chosen by 
the voters for that role alone.  The cornerstone of constituent sovereignty was the belief “that the 
persons delegated with the proper powers to form a plan of government, ought to possess the 
entire confidence of the people.” It was important then, that delegates shared the same 
sensibilities of the constituents.2 
Drafted by John Adams, the constitution of 1780 began with a Declaration of Rights, 
indicating the importance of the exchange of obligations for rights.  However, it did not entirely 
redefine attachment or establish universal male suffrage; potential voters had to meet income 
requirements and pay a poll tax.  This provision was immediately controversial, as illustrated in 
the ratification votes of the towns, many of whom argued that social affection and virtue could 
serve as better signifiers of attachment. For example, in its return, the town of Westhampton 
stated that the requirement would exclude persons who were otherwise “good friends to their 
Country and well wishers to the Common wealth of Massachusetts.” Nonetheless, after 
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submitting it to the towns for their approval, the legislature declared it ratified, and it went into 
effect.3 
Over time the population of Massachusetts grew, and as citizens moved into the western 
part of the state and established new towns, the provisions of the 1780 constitution regarding the 
expansion of the legislature went into effect.  As a result, the House ballooned to 500 seats, 
making it inefficient and ineffectual. However, those elites in Massachusetts dedicated to 
maintaining the existing constitution resisted calls for a new convention, asking “Is it wise, or 
just, or politic to exchange the results of our own experience for any theory, however plausible, 
that stands opposed to that experience?”  They were successful in preventing a public vote on 
whether to hold a convention until 1820, when Maine separated from Massachusetts and entered 
the union as an independent state.4 
The constitutional convention provided the opening reformers had been waiting for, and 
once the public voted in favor of a constitutional convention by a margin of nearly two to one, 
reformers successfully campaigned to win a majority of the seats at the convention.  The 
delegates convened in Boston on November 15, 1820; however, some delegates were emphatic 
that constitutional change was unnecessary and worked hard from the beginning to stymie any 
effort to redefine attachment as something other than property.  For example, Leverett 
Saltonstall, a delegate from Salem asked, “Is the constitution to be thrown by as an old-fashioned 
piece of furniture, that answered well enough in its day, but is now fit only to be stowed away in 
the lumber-room with the portraits of our ancestors?” Nevertheless, the delegates set to work, 
and questions of attachment were prominent. In general, as the convention progressed, it became 
clear that those delegates encouraging an expanded definition of attachment tended to be from 
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the western part of the state, while those opposed to change were generally from Boston and the 
surrounding area, reflecting patterns also seen in Pennsylvania and Virginia.5 
Reformers were not totally successful in challenging the idea that property was the best 
marker of attachment. They argued that the traditional signifier of attachment was insufficient 
and discriminatory and that limits on suffrage were a relic of the past, aristocratic and anti-
republican.  The restrictions, the Rev. Joseph Richardson noted, were so onerous that they would 
have excluded even Jesus Christ from voting: “The present constitution would have excluded our 
Saviour from the privilege.” Instead, they argued attachment should be measured by virtue.  As 
one delegate noted, “Where there is not private virtue, there cannot be public security and 
happiness.”6 
The issue of attachment through virtue and social affection was also reflected in the 
debates over the role of established churches, and to a lesser extent, of education. The third 
article of the 1780 constitution noted that “piety, religion, and morality” were essential to public 
welfare, and as such, it provided for established churches and public education. As a result, the 
link between virtue and civil government was already a part of Massachusetts’s constitutional 
framework at the time of the 1820 convention. The issue of continuing support for public 
education was not controversial and did not feature in the debates; however, the idea of 
established churches was becoming more contested, with some delegates arguing that “public 
worship of God” was necessary to “inculcate” civic values and others opposed to continued state 
support for religion, seeing it as an affront to religious liberty.  In the end, the convention voted 
for disestablishment, but the public overwhelmingly rejected the provision, signifying continued 
commitment to the idea that virtue signified attachment.7 
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In Virginia, the colonial patterns of dispersed settlements without strong institutions to 
bind colonists and create a shared identity led to circumstances that were different from those of 
Massachusetts.  Settlement in Virginia tended to be in large plantations along the eastern 
seaboard and internal rivers, not at all like the townships of Massachusetts. The Church of 
England and later the Episcopal Church did not have the influence on local and state politics that 
congregational churches did in New England.  As a result, the town meetings and church 
membership which were the basis for shared community values in New England did not translate 
to Virginia, and traditional British ideas about deference and property remained strong.  As a 
result, Virginia’s first constitution, though drafted in the midst of the revolutionary fervor of 
1776, reflected classical British views about suffrage and representation. Essentially, the 
convention “transplant[ed] a colonial system to an independent state.”8  
The Tidewater planter elite had dominated the colonial government, and its members 
were committed to maintaining their power after independence.  To that end, they created a 
system of attachment based on property. Under the 1776 constitution, each county received equal 
legislative representation regardless of population and tax contributions. This system favored the 
less densely populated eastern counties at the expense of the larger, faster growing western 
counties.  Furthermore, the legislature controlled the creation of new counties, so the eastern elite 
solidified their power by establishing larger (and therefore fewer) western counties.  Suffrage 
was based on the freehold, so only large landowners had the right to vote. Furthermore, the 
constitution allowed freeholders to vote in any county in which they possessed a freehold; this 
meant that many of the wealthiest Virginians were legally permitted to vote more than once in 
the same election. Many non-freeholding Virginians were beginning to realize that the former 
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colonial elite had no intention of creating a more expansive political system and were instead 
substituting their rule for British rule.9  
Despite almost immediate opposition to the constitution, the Tidewater-dominated 
legislature prevented a convention from being convened until 1829.  At the convention, reform-
minded candidates argued that the freehold was not the appropriate method of gauging one’s 
attachment to the community.  Instead, they asked, “what is the proper test of a man’s interest in, 
and attachment to, the community?”  In answering the question, reformers stressed that 
attachment as virtue was appropriate because the “intelligent, virtuous, and patriotic people of 
Virginia” will create a “free representative Republic, wherein the administrators of public affairs 
are the agents of the people.”  Non-freeholding Virginians could, then, be trusted not to yield to 
the excesses of democracy.  However, opponents of reform were successful in limiting efforts to 
recognize attachment based on social affection and virtue, coalescing around the idea of 
attachment through various forms of property.10  
Delegates to the Pennsylvania constitutional convention of 1837-1838 faced the same 
issues as the Massachusetts and Virginia delegates: non-elites who had been excluded from the 
political process successfully agitated for constitutional revision to address issues of attachment 
and citizenship.  The push for revision began years before, when a group of reformers supporting 
a return to the more expansive conception of attachment found in the 1776 constitution organized 
themselves into the Harrisburg Reform Convention. They argued that the 1790 convention gave 
citizens the right to “alter, reform or abolish their government, in such a manner as they may 
think proper,” and that in 1790, non-elites had not understood the constitutional principles at 
stake, allowing conservative elites to take advantage of that ignorance to draft a new constitution 
without the legal authority to do so.  Accordingly, it was time to correct those abuses of power.  
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They argued non-elites exhibited attachment through virtue and social affection and were now 
better able to participate in the process because “our people are enlightened – they have studied 
and rightly understand the nature of this government and the part in which it is defective.”  The 
reformers reconvened in January 1834, with representatives from more areas of the state present; 
its memorial enumerated a variety of reforms, including “the enjoyment and security of the right 
of universal suffrage.” They urged Pennsylvanians to petition the legislature for a vote on 
whether to hold a constitutional convention.11 
Petitions drafted by non-elites poured into the legislature, and by 1835, the legislature 
bowed to citizen pressure and authorized a vote by the public on whether to hold a convention.  
In October 1835, voters approved a measure supporting revision, and they then elected delegates 
who met in Harrisburg in May 1837.  As in other states, reformers tended to be from the western 
part of the state.  The convention addressed a number of issues, including the changing definition 
of attachment.  A core of reform delegates argued for universal suffrage based on an expansive 
view of attachment grounded in social affection and community interests.  One of the leading 
reform delegates, Thomas Earle, based his argument on Locke’s language of rights: “A man 
should be entitled to vote because he is a man, and as such, interested in all that concerns the 
community in which he resides, and the laws under which he lives.”  Earle was joined by H. G. 
Rogers of Alleghany, who advocated attachment based on virtue by arguing that the constitution 
should be based upon “two broad and enduring pillars – universal suffrage and general 
education.”12   
Texas did not draft its first constitution until the nineteenth century.  Beginning in 1835, 
inhabitants of Texas, led by American settlers to the area, fought for the right of self-
determination from Mexico.  They justified their actions on two decisions of the Mexican central 
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government. First, the government had denied Texas’s request to be admitted to the Mexican 
confederation as an independent state. Second, the President of Mexico, Antonio Lopez de Santa 
Anna, abrogated the Mexican Constitution of 1824, and the country shifted from a republic to a 
military dictatorship. Many Texans objected, casting themselves as the nineteenth century heirs 
to the American Revolution, arguing that they had the right to decide whether or not to relinquish 
their constitutional protections and live under the new system of government and arguing that 
they were being enslaved by the Mexican government.  Furthermore, many Texans were 
concerned that the Mexican government would  “give liberty to our slaves” by enforcing its 1829 
decision to abolish slavery.  Stephen F. Austin, who would become the president of the Republic 
of Texas, reflected that representation in the constitutional convention should be equal and based 
on a broad definition of attachment, one grounded in common values and interest; any 
inequalities “should be cautiously avoided, so far as practicable, in a body that is to settle the 
political destinies of a community where all are equally interested.”13 
Meeting in March 1836, the delegates began by issuing a Declaration of Independence 
from Mexico, justifying their decision on both ideological and practical grounds.  Echoing the 
American Declaration of Independence, the document argued that the actions of the Mexican 
government led to the dissolution of civil society and then a reversion to the state of nature.  One 
of the Declaration’s chief complaints reflected the idea of values as essential to citizenship: the 
Mexican government had failed to establish a system of public education which was necessary to 
promote virtue.  Reflecting this idea of a broader conception of attachment, the 1836 constitution 
did not include property requirements for suffrage or for office-holding.14 
The Texas Constitution of 1836 remained in force until Texas was annexed by the United 
States in 1845.  As part of the annexation process, the United States required Texas to draft a 
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new constitution to be approved both by the people of Texas and the United States Senate. On 
May 5, 1845, the president of the Republic of Texas, Anson Jones, called for an election of 
delegates to a constitutional convention.  The delegates convened in Austin on July 4, 1845, and 
selected Thomas Rusk, a physician and veteran of the war for independence, as president. As 
with other constitutions drafted during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the appropriate 
definition of attachment was central to the proceedings. 
One key issue of contention stemmed from the proposed naturalization requirement.  
Delegates James Mayfield and John Anderson objected to the potential exclusion of people who 
had been living in Texas “in good faith and with a strong attachment” to their communities. In 
addition to this practical objection, the delegates objected to the limits on ideological grounds: 
they were “utterly impolitic” and “antidemocratic.”  In the end, suffrage was extended to free 
men over the age of twenty-one, excluding Indians and descendants of Africans, who were 
citizens of the United States or of the Republic of Texas at the time of annexation and who met 
minimum residency requirements. There were no property requirements, but a very clear racial 
caste system was put into place.15 
* . *. * 
What best conjured fears of the lack of affectionate attachment was social discontent 
from the people: a mob or something even more disruptive, a rebellion. Mob culture had been a 
part of American political life since colonial times, but the early nineteenth century experienced 
an uptick in the amount of mob violence, and in some instances, the nature of the violence was 
changing, resulting in more extreme damage to persons and property.  Many elites became 
concerned with mob violence and rebellion, and as a result, the issue emerged in state 
constitutional proceedings. This theme reflected both positive and negative views of attachment.  
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First, some delegates characterized it in a positive sense: defining attachment broadly and 
expanding suffrage would bring more white males into the political system and make them feel 
vested in its success and stability; they would, in turn, be less likely to rebel. Other delegates, 
however, spoke of this fear in negative terms: attachment meant a shared commitment to 
protecting the rights of property and class privilege against lower class mobs and usurpers.16 
In Massachusetts, the 1780 constitution reflected the idea that “property itself required 
protection,” and those delegates who wanted to maintain attachment based on property relied on 
Blackstone’s ideas of property as a sign of independence.  Expanding suffrage, they argued, 
would increase the number of voters, many of whom would be susceptible to corrupt influence. 
They believed this would result in a dangerous shift in government from a republic to a 
democracy because democracy was only a brief stop on the way to mob rule and despotism. 
Justice Joseph Story made the link between poverty and despotism explicit: “Poverty leads to 
temptation and temptation often leads to vice, and vice to military despotism.”17   
Additionally, delegates opposed to expansion of suffrage claimed that it would be 
unnecessarily dangerous to change the current constitution in order to satisfy abstract principles 
of natural rights. Justice Story asked, “Is it then wise, or just, or politic to exchange the result of 
our own experience for any theory, however plausible, that stands opposed to experience, for a 
theory that might possibly do as well?” Furthermore, the current method of apportionment has 
not caused any harm: “[W]hile so many men contend that it is wrong in theory, no one has 
shown that it has been either injurious or inconvenient in practice.” This conservative rhetoric, 
stressing the need to maintain the social order provided by the status quo, was especially 
effective in Massachusetts, and apportionment in the Senate remained tied to taxation.18  
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A smaller group of delegates stressed the positive association of attachment with 
rebellion.  They believed that redefining attachment to allow broader suffrage would encourage 
more affectionate bonds among the lower classes, which would in turn make those men less 
likely to engage in “politics outside.” They argued that allowing all free men over the age of 
twenty-one to vote would make them useful, productive citizens. One of the most outspoken 
proponents of expanding suffrage was J. T. Austin of Boston, who echoed this idea: “By refusing 
this right to them, you array them against the laws; but give them the rights of citizens – mix 
them with the good parts of society, you disarm them.” Thus, expanding suffrage was good not 
just for the newly enfranchised but for the entire community. Other delegates relied on natural 
law and history to offer evidence for their position, noting that if attachment based on property 
continued, social and political order might eventually be undermined, as the people would 
perpetually protest against a constitution that based representation on property, denying their 
natural rights.19 
In Virginia, delegates to the 1829-1830 convention who did not want to alter the 
association of attachment with property argued that if reformers succeeded in expanding 
suffrage, class hierarchies would be erased, undermining social and political stability. The 
existing constitution had “shielded” them and allowed them to live “freely and happily,” and 
they argued that to disrupt a functioning system in favor of the unknown was not only foolish but 
dangerous. Conversely, the basis of the reformers’ argument was that the current systems of 
suffrage and representation violated the natural rights of Virginians as established first by the 
American Revolution and then enshrined in the Virginia Declaration of Rights. Thus, they 
argued from what they considered first principles, “the sovereignty of the people and the equality 
of men,” and they sharply objected to conservative characterizations of such principles as “mere 
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abstractions” because those first principles “became practical in Virginia in 1776.” Because 
government was created “not for the restraint of . . . rights but for their security and 
enlargement,” suffrage should be expanded.20 
Thus, reformers argued that theories of natural rights and personal citizenship could and 
should become institutionalized through state constitutions, bringing more white males into 
citizenship, promoting social order, and strengthening society. Those delegates opposed to 
revision, however, argued that governments should be founded on experience and evidence 
because “there are no original principles of Government at all. . . . The principles of 
Government, are those principles only, which the people who form the Government, choose to 
adopt and apply to themselves.”  They were unwilling to risk liberalizing citizenship (and then 
suffrage and representation) because they believed such liberalization would undermine the 
stability of society. The purpose of government was to restrain human nature, lest Virginia 
experience the terrors of the French revolution. This was a fear exploited by the Federalist Party 
in the 1790s, and it still carried weight in Virginia, even after the party’s demise.21 
The same concerns for public order existed in Pennsylvania at the time of the 1837-1838 
convention. The Riot Damage Law, designed to protect private property, allowed individuals 
who experienced losses from rioting to recover damages from the municipalities in which the 
rioting had taken place.  However, rioting had been so common in (and expensive to) the city of 
Philadelphia in the years leading up to the convention that one of the delegates representing the 
city introduced provisions to shift responsibility from municipalities to the state legislature and 
to strengthen fines on those found guilty of rioting. Another delegate, speaking in favor of the 
provision, noted that smaller municipalities were just as susceptible to riots as larger cities. 
Clearly, fear of rioting was prominent in the minds of many delegates.22 
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Several Pennsylvania delegates argued that expanding attachment could minimize the 
threat of rebellion by creating positive bonds between the newly enfranchised and their 
community.  One delegate highlighted the struggle some Atlantic states were experiencing to 
maintain their populations due to westward expansion, comparing Pennsylvania’s more 
restrictive suffrage laws to the more expansive ones in newer western states, many of which were 
populated with settlers from Pennsylvania. Delegate Russell was most critical of the tax 
requirement for suffrage, arguing it was “odious” and unsustainable on the bases of expediency 
and equality.  It was “a relic of that property qualification, which has been deemed in all ages, by 
the privileged class, so powerful a chain to bind and restrain people.”  He did not deny that 
property rights were important, but argued that they were not superior to the rights to life and 
liberty nor was property a sign of attachment to the community. Furthermore, he believed there 
were practical reasons to expand suffrage: laborers, essential to society, should not be barred 
from voting because doing so discouraged their ambition and weakened their attachment to the 
community.23 
In Pennsylvania, the issue took on an added dimension: the fear of national political 
division. At the time of the 1837-1838 convention, African American males were not prohibited 
from voting. The 1790 constitution did not restrict suffrage to white males, but by the 1830s, the 
abolition movement had become so divisive that it became a part of the debate over suffrage in 
Pennsylvania.  Several delegates expressed fear that a failure to restrict voting rights of African 
Americans would be seen by the South and its sympathizers as a symbol of Pennsylvania’s 
commitment to abolition and therefore as a threat to national unity.  Continuing to allow African 
American males the right to vote had the potential to, as delegate Charles Ingersoll stated, 
“disturb the Union.”  Although Ingersoll opposed slavery and supported eventual citizenship for 
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African Americans, his primary concerns were for the continuation of the Union and the integrity 
of the federal constitution, which his father, Jared Ingersoll, had helped to write. After much 
debate, the new constitution privileged national unity and disfranchised African American 
males.24 
Affection and virtue, then, were important components of the new definition of 
attachment that was emerging across the United States during the nineteenth century, and 
reformers were arguing that this new definition should replace property as the sole marker of 
attachment in state constitutions.  However, despite this common theme, significant differences 
existed among the four states.  In Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, the transition from 
subsistence farming and small-scale production to industrialization brought with it a transition 
from servitude and slavery to wage labor.  At the same time, immigration, especially from 
Ireland, increased, and many of these immigrants settled in Massachusetts and began to work as 
wage laborers in the developing textile industry. In Pennsylvania, the strong Quaker objections 
to slavery meant that the number of slaves in the state was declining, down from approximately 
four thousand in 1780, when the first law encouraging gradual emancipation was passed by the 
state legislature, to less than two thousand by 1800.  Wage laborers filled the positions formerly 
held by slaves.  In both states, laborers argued that despite not owning property or working for 
themselves, they were sufficiently independent and attached to their communities to merit 
inclusion into the polity. In the slave states of Virginia and Texas, wage labor was less common 
than it was in northern states, and slaveholders worked to create alliances among white men of 
different classes, creating a racial caste system which expanded the rights, including suffrage, 
available to white men.25 
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Partisan politics also impacted how states redefined attachment, but its impact was not 
uniform across the four states.  In most of the country, the Federalist party collapsed after the 
War of 1812, but it maintained a toe-hold in Massachusetts.  Noted Federalists like Daniel 
Webster and Joseph Story attended the constitutional convention of 1820-1821, and they were 
able to take advantage of divisions among the Democrats, forming alliances with more 
conservative delegates to maintain property as an important marker of attachment. After 1800, 
Pennsylvania was primarily a one-party state, but divisions within the “Jeffersonians” about the 
best way to bring about economic and political equality remained, even spilling over into the 
constitutional convention of 1838, where delegates debated the appropriate definition of 
attachment to one’s community. In all four states, the rise of the second party system led to wider 
political participation by bringing more white men of all classes into politics, but it was not 
totally egalitarian. Political elites worked hard to extend privileges to upwardly mobile non-
elites, but they did not embrace full participatory democracy, and they held on to trappings of the 
deferential system that predated the Revolution. As historian Harry L. Watson noted, the new 
system “tended to channel popular democratic energies in conservative directions, giving 
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BALANCING PULIC DUTY AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
 One of the most compelling arguments constitutional delegates in all four of the states 
made in favor of a changing meaning of attachment was to define it through public service, 
including paying taxes and serving in the militia. This conception of attachment was not new to 
the nineteenth century, but had existed in the United States since the Revolutionary era. As the 
new states drafted their first constitutions in the midst of the Revolution, men who did not own 
property but who had served in the war watched to see whether they would be granted the right 
to vote. A Pennsylvania resident writing in a local paper voiced a common aphorism of the day: 
“Every man who pays his shot and bears his lot is naturally and constitutionally an Elector in a 
city.”1 
In Massachusetts, delegates argued that citizens exhibited attachment through public 
service in a number of ways, including tax payment and militia service. For example, one 
delegate argued that men should not be “oblige[d] to buy their freedom.  They perform militia 
duty – they pay a tax for all they possess,” and that “[t]o deprive a man of the privilege till he 
acquires property, was an encroachment of the fundamental principles of our constitution.” Thus, 
attachment to the community could be proven through means other than property. Other 
delegates, however, defined public service differently; they argued that suffrage was not a right 
but a “privilege and . . . the reward of good conduct.”  Furthermore, property was the “greatest 
object of civil society” and that “which keeps the great machine of society in motion.” As such, 
it should be protected.  Delegates also spoke in terms of fairness; districts and citizens who 
provided a greater share of the state’s revenue should be entitled to proportional representation.  
One delegate noted that although he was not “unfriendly to the rights of the people,” he believed 
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that men who contributed more to the “common stock” should be entitled to a “greater voice in 
the government.”2 
Virginia’s 1776 constitution located attachment in the freehold, and this provision of the 
constitution provoked opposition almost immediately. Thomas Jefferson was one of its most 
outspoken critics. He had seen the way landless tenants objected to militia service in the Seven 
Years War because they had no property of their own to defend and saw no point in defending 
the property of others, many of whom did not actually fight.  As a result, he believed that it was 
not just to define attachment strictly through property; it should include public service.  He 
argued that suffrage should be extended because under the provisions of the constitution, a 
“majority of the men in the state, who pay and fight for its support, are unrepresented in the 
legislature, the roll of freeholders entitled to vote not including generally the half of those on the 
roll of the militia, or of the tax-gatherers.” Although he could not attend the convention, he had 
supported a draft of the constitution that would not have changed the meaning of attachment, but 
instead would have given all landless free white males fifty acres of land and the vote.  However, 
the delegates to the convention dropped this provision from the final document.  In 1783, in an 
attempt to correct what he saw as the errors of the 1776 constitution, Jefferson drafted a revised 
constitution that changed the suffrage requirements from the freehold to residency or service in 
the militia and representation to a system based on the number of electors.3 
 In addition to Jefferson, other Virginians, including James Madison, were concerned 
about the 1776 constitution’s narrow conception of attachment. Elites and non-elites objected to 
the use of the freehold. Revolutionary War veterans who did not own property soon learned that 
military service would not be enough to confer political rights. As early as 1795, residents of 
Brooke County (now in West Virginia) noted that the sixth article of the Declaration of Rights 
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was being “denied in principle and abrogated in practice” because at least half of the county’s 
male population lacked sufficient property to vote, despite having served in the militia during the 
Revolution and paying taxes. In drafting their memorial and sending it to the legislature, they 
called attention to the fact that many Virginians were not content to let elites locate political 
rights in property; instead, they argued those rights should be located in the person who should 
be allowed to prove his “attachment to the community” in a variety of ways.4 
These reform ideas carried into the 1829-1830 constitutional convention. However, those 
Virginians hoping to locate attachment in public service met fierce resistance from a critical 
mass of the propertied elite, many of whom saw property as an essential element in political 
rights.  They argued that it should remain the “solid, indestructible foundation” of government, 
and accordingly, they objected to any attempt by reformers to modify the freehold requirement 
for suffrage.  For conservatives, persons and property were the two constituent elements of 
society; as Abel Upshur noted, “the very idea of society, carries with it the idea of property.”  
Locke, after all, argued that the function of the social contract was to protect life, liberty, and 
property. Government, then, should reflect the interests of the propertied class.  In response to 
claims of the existence of an oligarchy by reformers, conservatives noted, “We do not propose to 
represent money, but the rights and interests which spring from the possession of money.” Only 
“lasting ownership of the soil of this country” was sufficient to prove attachment to the 
community required to be entrusted with the right to vote. Benjamin Watkins Leigh went so far 
as to argue that removing the freehold requirement would lead to the end of free government in 
the state.5 
Delegates who favored redefining attachment argued that property was not the only mark 
of attachment to the community; citizens could prove attachment through such actions as 
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payment of taxes and militia service. Expanding suffrage would be good for the state because it 
would increase the number of citizens vested in its success; as one delegate noted, “we ought to 
spread wide the foundation of our government, that all white men have a direct interest in its 
protection.” Furthermore, reformers, borrowing from the language of the Revolution, argued that 
the freeholder requirement “degrades the non-freeholder to the level of the slave.”6 
The debate over attachment was not limited to discussions among the delegates 
themselves; memorialists also appealed to the delegates by emphasizing non-freeholders’ 
permanent commitment to the community by criteria other than property.  They demanded the 
“political privileges for which our fathers in the Revolutionary war fought and bled, for the 
welfare of the rising generation.” They noted that they exhibited attachment to their communities 
by paying their fines and serving in the militia when called: “In the time of war, we have to face 
a foreign power, and fight or die. And fight for what? Not for our own peculiar preservation, but 
for the safety and property of the opulent and rich of our country.” The memorialists of Loudon 
country used even more strident language, noting the hypocrisy of Virginia in presenting itself as 
the most republican state in the union when it was in fact the most aristocratic.  The existing 
constitution and its narrow view of property as the only marker of attachment to the community 
perpetuated such aristocracy; as a result, “the fire which, in ’76 was enkindled on Freedom’s 
altar, has. . . been smothered amid the rubbish of a rotten constitution.”7 
Expansionist delegates used these memorials and the arguments presented in them as 
evidence for the necessity of removing property as a maker for citizenship. However, they had 
only limited success: a majority of the delegates did support extending the right to vote to heads 
of households and leaseholders, but a minority supported removing the freehold all together. 
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Thus, reformers accomplished the expansion of suffrage, but failed to achieve their primary goal: 
to “put person over property as the locus for citizenship.”8 
Unlike Massachusetts and Virginia, attachment had never been linked to property in 
Pennsylvania.  As delegates to Pennsylvania’s first constitutional convention drafted its 
constitution in 1776, non-elites who had been shut out of the colonial system of power took 
advantage of both the print media and divisions among political elite to articulate their 
preferences for a more participatory system of government. They argued for a clear break from 
their colonial past: “Do not mechaniks and farmers constitute ninety-nine out of a hundred of the 
people of America? If these, by their occupations, are to be excluded from having any share in 
the choice of their rulers, or forms of government, would it not be best to acknowledge the 
jurisdiction of the British Parliament, which is composed entirely of gentlemen?”9 
These non-elites were successful in pressuring the delegates to create a system very 
different from the colonial system: legislative seats would be apportioned based on the number 
of taxable inhabitants, and the liberal suffrage provisions (all free male taxpayers twenty-one 
years old and older who had resided in the state for one year could vote) meant that almost ninety 
percent of the male population could vote, up from fifty percent during the colonial period. Thus, 
attachment was entirely divorced from property ownership and instead equally vested in the free 
male population.10 
The issue of public service as a signifier of attachment to the community emerged in 
Texas in 1845 during the debate over the method of apportionment of legislative representatives. 
In a pattern similar to the east coast states, delegates from the western part of the state believed 
they were not being fairly represented.  They argued that it was only fair to protect their region, 
as its inhabitants had shown deep attachment to and patriotism for Texas, enduring “war, 
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pestilence, and famine,” in its successful attempt to “drive the enemy out of the country.”  
However, their public service did not come without a cost; the population shrank, largely 
because the government had not been able to protect them, and they argued that it was unfair to 
punish them further by taking away their representation. Thus, service in the war for 
independence against Mexico also became a part of the debate over attachment. These feelings 
were especially pronounced for Tejanos living near what would become the Texas-Mexico 
border. Many of them joined militias and fought alongside Anglos for independence, playing 
important roles as mediators and developing their own sense of American nationalism.11 
*. *. * 
One of the most significant developments of the Virginia Constitution of 1830 was the 
shift away from attachment as the freehold and towards attachment as other forms of property. 
Despite the best efforts of reformers to divorce attachment and property, the constitution did not 
entirely eliminate property as a signifier of attachment; instead, delegates reconceived 
attachment as property by acknowledging the importance of the house-keeper. The house-keeper, 
or household master, controlled the productivity of a number of less-free or unfree workers – his 
wife, his children, his slaves.  The position of house-keeper implied competency and 
independence, as his success depended on his ability to manage all aspects of production and 
reproduction within his domain, including the labor of other household members. All of these 
factors made attachment through householding an acceptable alternative to the freehold to a 
majority of the delegates. Acknowledging the importance of the house-keeper reflected what 
historian Christopher Curtis describes as “a more democratic belief that diverse forms of 
property ownership also possessed political value.” At the same time, however, this change was 
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not fully democratic, because the house-keeper was the only member of the household given the 
right to vote.12 
The shift away from the freehold was a function of the changing economy in Virginia and 
the nation, which was becoming increasingly more commercial, centralized, and interconnected. 
It was the result of the reconciliation of “the state’s republican visions with an increasingly 
hegemonic conception of land as a mere form of capital.”  Jefferson’s conception of citizenship 
vested in the yeoman famers whose love of land translated into a love of county could not 
withstand the market forces of the nineteenth century.  Instead, property came to be seen as just 
one of many forms of wealth, no longer holding its former privileged position. As a result of this 
change, property in slavery replaced real property as the “fundamental property relation” in 
Virginia. And because house-keepers controlled slave labor, attachment came to be associated 
with owning slaves.13   
 From colonial times, slavery had been an integral part of Virginia’s political, economic, 
and social structures. The Chesapeake’s earliest cash crop, tobacco, relied heavily on slave labor, 
leading to an increase in the number of slaves in Virginia.  But at the same time as demand for 
slave labor along the Atlantic coast fell, it began to rise in the old southwest where cotton 
cultivation was becoming increasingly profitable.  Virginia slave owners realized they could 
offset losses due to the collapse of the tobacco market by selling their slaves through the internal 
market.  Selling slaves to owners out of state had the double benefit of increasing planters’ 
profits while promoting social order by reducing the number of potentially rebellious slaves 
living in the state.14 
Changing from property attachment to house-keeper attachment had the added advantage 
of helping to “reconcile the democratic spirit of reform with the desired result of white male 
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suffrage.”  Ending the freehold notion of attachment became a compromise position that offered 
some – but not too much – reform.  The transcripts of the convention proceedings indicate that 
delegates were divided into three main groups: those who favored maintaining the freehold, 
those who wanted to abolish most requirements for white male suffrage, and those somewhere in 
the middle. The essential questions, then, that determined how delegates were classified along 
the reform spectrum were the ones framed by delegate Eugenius M. Wilson of Monogalia 
County: “By what means can we ascertain where his interests and attachments are centered? 
What test shall we apply? What requisites, then, shall we demand without which the man shall be 
excluded from the exercise of this, the most honorable and precious of his natural rights?”15 
 One block of delegates arrived in Richmond opposed to any changes to the 1776 
constitution; led by Abel Uphsur, they argued that alternations had the potential to undermine 
social and political stability.  Another group of delegates, including Alexander Campbell, were 
fully committed to removing the freehold as the standard of attachment and suffrage.  A third, 
more moderate group, existed between the two extremes.  Benjamin Watkins Leigh, a member of 
the first group, worked hard behind the scenes to minimize differences among those delegates 
who supported the continued reliance on the freehold as a sign of attachment, successfully 
“maintain[ing] an anti-democratic consensus.” While he was not able to convince a majority of 
delegates to maintain the freehold, he was able to create a compromise position which defined 
attachment as protection of a variety of types of property, not just the freehold. This property 
could include slaves, what Upshur called a “peculiar” property requiring special protection and 
conferring its own form of attachment.16 
In Texas, the meaning of attachment as protection of different types of property was 
influenced by the Spanish and Mexican legal traditions that predated the Republic of Texas and 
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American annexation, and in many instances, this more expansive view of property was less 
controversial than it had been in older states whose legal and political traditions included the 
freehold.  During the 1845 convention, property emerged as an important part of the debates: 
delegates addressed issues such as the property rights of Texans in the “unoccupied lands,” 
community property, and homestead exemption frequently and with great intensity.  As delegates 
argued, it was important for the constitution to include the homestead exemption because it 
would serve to “protect the head of family” and to ensure happy families which would in turn 
create a happy society.17 
The convention made noteworthy decisions for its provisions regarding women and 
property. Texas’s unique frontier history, including wars with Mexico and Native Americans in 
the western part of the state, and its Spanish legal tradition, shaped the protections for women 
property-owners in ways different from other states.  In many cases, these concepts, which 
would have been controversial elsewhere, merited no real debate during the proceedings.  The 
convention excluded homesteads from forced sales and prohibited husbands from selling 
homesteads without their wives’ consent. Finally, the constitution provided that any real or 
personal property a woman acquired before her marriage or acquired after it belonged her alone. 
These provisions seemed to indicate that delegates understood the importance of women 
property-owners to the stability of Texas, but this fact did not lead them to extend suffrage to 
women.18  
Delegates also addressed the issue of attachment as protection of property in slaves. 
Slavery played an extensive role in the debates over formulas for representation and taxation, 
and delegates argued that it was the responsibility of the convention to make slavery a permanent 
institution to protect “the interests of the owner.” The final provisions of the constitution 
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reflected this conception of attachment by prohibiting the legislature from emancipating slaves 
without both the consent of the owner and compensation and from preventing emigrants from 
entering Texas with their property in slaves.  While issues of how to include slaves in formulas 
for apportionment and taxation often led to extensive debate, these provisions of the constitution 
protecting the institution of slavery were largely uncontroversial and did not merit much of the 
delegates’ attention.19 
*. *. * 
The large number of slaves in Virginia created a potentially dangerous situation, and 
Virginians were deeply concerned over slave rebellions.  They saw free blacks as troublemakers, 
potential organizers of slave revolts, and many Virginians, including Jefferson, wanted them 
exiled from the state. In 1800, Gabriel’s rebellion seemed to bring to life slave-owners fears.  
Gabriel, a literate blacksmith, had been hired out as a wage laborer in Richmond by his owner, 
Thomas Prosser. According to historian Douglas Egerton, this offered him the opportunity to 
form relationships with other artisans, white and black, all of whom began to realize that they 
experienced the same class-based inequalities. Gabriel planned to lead a slave rebellion in 
Richmond, and he hoped non-elite whites would join him.  However, he postponed his rebellion 
due to weather, and before it could occur, officials learned of it. James Monroe, the governor of 
Virginia, called out the militia, and Gabriel and twenty-four other slaves were captured and 
hung.  Gabriel’s rebellion, along with Nat Turner’s 1831 rebellion, terrified white Virginians, 
and this fear motivated them to consider forms of attachment that might include more poor 
whites while restricting more threatening groups like free blacks.20  
The final reconception of attachment adopted by framers of nineteenth century state 
constitutions was attachment as a means of limiting political rights of potentially dangerous 
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groups. This form of attachment reflects the paradoxical nature of changes to suffrage during the 
nineteenth century. At the same time that framers of state constitutions were moving closer to 
universal white male suffrage, they were deliberately refusing suffrage and citizenship to other 
groups of the population, including women and free African Americans, who were seen by the 
ruling elite as threats to their political and social power.  Since colonial times, political elites had 
restricted suffrage to undesirable or dangerous groups, including vagrants and paupers. Because 
of their transitory nature, vagrants were not seen to possess sufficient attachment to their 
community.  Most elites held in common the belief that economic opportunity was open and 
accessible to all, and as such, poverty was seen as a personal failing; paupers and vagrants were 
untrustworthy and lacked independence, making them ineligible for citizenship and the 
corresponding rights and privileges.21 
Classifying residents based on their citizenship status (citizen versus alien) was a practice 
the British brought to the American colonies.  It reflected the idea that citizenship carried with it 
both rights or privileges and obligations. After independence, American political elites began to 
redefine and broaden citizenship: “birth within allegiance” still automatically conferred 
citizenship, but aliens who chose to consent to American rules and who proved their fitness for 
membership could become naturalized citizens.  However, the logical outcome of this policy, 
when applied to “pariah groups,” including Indians, slaves, and free blacks, threatened the order 
of American society, and birthright citizenship was not automatically granted to everyone born in 
the United States until the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 
The Virginia convention of 1829-1830 debated the issue of attachment extensively, and 
many reform delegates advocated for universal male suffrage based on natural rights.  However, 
such arguments were ultimately unsuccessful, due in part to the strategy orchestrated by 
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Benjamin Watkins Leigh to convince enough moderates to join conservatives in rejecting more 
expansive suffrage provisions.  Conservatives made a “Pandora’s Box” argument: if the 
definition of citizenship shifted fully from property to person, the only logical outcome was true 
universal suffrage, which would allow even women and children to vote.  Abel Uphsur noted 
that if that was the case, demographics would result in women and children automatically having 
a majority over white males.23 
The 1790 Pennsylvania constitution did not define “freeman” as exclusively white, and 
so African Americans in some parts of the state, like Bucks County, had been participating in 
elections regularly. Most African Americans who were qualified to vote, however, did not 
participate for fear of inciting a violent white response. Despite the small percentage of African 
Americans who actually voted, delegates to the 1837-1838 convention introduced a measure to 
insert “white” before “freemen” in the constitution’s suffrage provision.  Debate was fierce, with 
some delegates arguing restricting suffrage based on race would lead to the “destruction of 
liberty,” while others argued that “freemen” had never included African Americans and that “the 
elevation of the black, is the degradation of the white man.”24 
Delegates arguing for attachment as a means of limiting marginalized groups opposed 
African American suffrage on a number of grounds. Delegate James Merrill objected to any 
suffrage rights grounded in natural rights: “We have no natural rights. We are making a rule of 
government, and a government founded on the laws of nature would be a return to savage life, 
where every man would do what he pleased, making the law for himself.” Benjamin Martin 
made one of the most stringent cases against extending suffrage to African Americans, arguing:  
[T]o hold out to [African Americans] social rights, or to incorporate them with ourselves 
in the exercise of the right of franchise, is a violation of the law of nature and would lead 
to . . . the resentment of the white population. . . . [T]he divisionary line between the 
races, is so strongly marked by the Creator, that it is unwise and cruelly unjust, in any 
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way, to amalgamate them, for it must be apparent to every well judging person, that the 
elevation of the black is the degradation of the white man; and by endeavoring to alter the 
order of nature, we would, in all probability, bring about a war between the races.25 
 
Delegates who favored attachment as universal male suffrage, regardless of race, made a 
variety of arguments in favor of extending the right to vote to African Americans, ranging from 
theoretical to practical.  Some expansionists argued restrictions were anathema to liberty and 
would lead to despotism. Other delegates made more practical arguments, noting that allowing 
African Americans to voted would create attachment to the community, transforming them into 
useful and productive members of society. A third group based their argument on a paternalistic 
sense of duty; as one delegated stated, “I believe it our duty, to do everything in our power, to 
elevate and improve the condition of the colored race, and to make them fit to enjoy the benefits 
of our laws, instead of cutting them off.” In the end, however, these arguments failed to persuade 
a majority of the delegates; the convention voted to limit suffrage to white male taxpayers by the 
vote of seventy-seven to forty-five.26 
Non-elites in Pennsylvania paid close attention to the debates around African American 
suffrage.  The Pittsburg Gazette, an African American newspaper, used the language of rights 
and privilege to address the issue: “We can really not see the justice of excluding native born 
freemen of this commonwealth from this privilege, merely because their skins are a little darker 
than some of their neighbors.” Other African Americans drafted memorials appealing to the 
delegates to refrain from inserting “white” before “freemen.”  The Gardner-Hinton Memorial 
and the Pittsburgh Memorial were both attempts to sway delegates, arguing that African 
Americans who met all other constitutional requirements for suffrage should not be excluded 
simply because of their race. Once the new constitution with its ban on African American voting 
was approved by the delegates, Robert Purvis, a prominent Philadelphia African American 
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drafted the Appeal of the Four Thousand Citizens, a plea to Pennsylvanians eligible to vote on 
ratification of the constitution. In it, he used the language of rights to make his appeal to them to 
vote against ratification, arguing that African Americans were considered citizens by the framers 
of the earlier constitutions and that depriving them of citizenship and its associated right of 
suffrage would be have the effect of subjecting them to tyranny of the majority. Ultimately, 
Purvis’s appeal, though logical and articulate, was unsuccessful, and the voters ratified the 
constitution by a narrow margin, enshrining into constitutional law the paradox of expanded 
white suffrage and African American disfranchisement.27 
At the Texas proceedings, the issue of whether attachment should be used to restrict 
marginalized groups centered on the inclusion of the word “white” in the qualifications for 
voting. Because of Texas’s history, many citizens of Mexican descent were otherwise qualified 
to vote; if suffrage was restricted to white men, would they be excluded from the rolls? Several 
delegates noted that “white” was impossible to define and, if included, could “exclude the race 
which we found in possession of the country when we came here.”  The lone delegate born in 
Texas, José Antonio Navarro, argued its inclusion was “odious, captious, and redundant; and 
may be the means at elections of disqualifying persons who are legal voters, but who perhaps by 
arbitrary judges may not be considered as white.”  Other objections stemmed from the proposed 
naturalization requirement.  Delegates James Mayfield and John Anderson objected to the 
potential exclusion of people who had been living in Texas “in good faith and with a strong 
attachment” to their communities. In addition to this practical objection, the delegates objected to 
the limits on ideological grounds: they were “utterly impolitic” and “antidemocratic.”  In the end, 
suffrage was extended to free men over the age of twenty-one, excluding Indians and 
descendants of Africans, who were citizens of the United States or of the Republic of Texas at 
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the time of annexation and who met minimum residency requirements. These provisions are 
another example of the paradox of attachment: access to citizenship increased for white males, 
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As the non-freeholders of Richmond illustrated, nineteenth century America was not an 
egalitarian society in which citizenship was automatically conferred on all residents. Instead, 
citizenship was linked to the idea of attachment to the community, but the precise meaning of 
that attachment was contested. Americans inherited the traditional British idea of property as the 
most effective and important maker of attachment, and many early state constitutions reflected 
this idea through the use property as a basis for suffrage and representation.  Advocates for an 
expanded definition of attachment, including the non-freeholders of Richmond, argued that 
property was not the only sign of attachment to the community; attachment could be proven 
through such actions as payment of taxes and militia service.  Elites and upwardly mobile non-
elites alike began to agitate for a more expansive definition of citizenship in state houses, 
constitutional conventions, and the print media.   
The shifting nature of citizenship and its relationship to suffrage and representation 
became one of the most salient political issues of the nineteenth century.  The Lockean language 
of rights that political elites had used to justify revolution did not go away after independence, 
and ideological differences among political elites led to heated debates as states framed and then 
revised their constitutions.  Upwardly mobile non-elites absorbed the language of natural rights 
and attempted to take advantage of these divisions between elites to create more inclusive and 
expansive frames of government.  Most significantly, they began to challenge the position of 
many conservative elites that property was the requisite component of citizenship and therefore 
the appropriate basis of suffrage  and of representation, which in turn lead to a fundamental 
reconfiguration of the relationship between property ownership and self-government.  These 
debates took place in the public sphere, through print culture, and at state constitutional 
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conventions, and the conventions became the ultimate political battlegrounds, the place where 
political theory was transformed into actual political institutions.   
As is evidenced in the four states I have examined in this thesis, the shift to locating 
citizenship in all white males rather than in property was not uniform over time or in practice. 
Building on the changing political culture of nineteenth century America, reformers were 
successful in reconceiving attachment in several key ways. By emphasizing shared interests and 
the values of patriotism, virtue, and social order, upwardly mobile white males who did not own 
property were successful in achieving citizenship; they convinced political elites that they 
deserved to be members of the polity, with all of the rights and obligations that entailed. They 
were most effective when they coupled their appeal for citizenship with evidence that they made 
valuable contributions to the community in general and to the elites more specifically: they paid 
taxes, served in militias, oversaw the productivity of dependent members of their households.    
At the same time, they were careful not to demand a truly democratic society; in fact, they 
argued that they deserved inclusion because they helped to keep potentially dangerous and 
destabilizing groups, namely women, free blacks, and slaves, under control. In essence, 
citizenship and suffrage moved from a class-based system to a new caste-based system.  
Although this study is limited to four states, it makes important contributions to the study 
of state constitutions.  Earlier scholarship focused on the frameworks of government that the 
states created in the aftermath of independence. How alike or different from their colonial 
antecedents were they?  To what extent did they reflect the ideals of the American Revolution? 
How did states differ in the qualifications for suffrage and office-holding? Consensus historians 
emphasized the progress states made in expanding suffrage to all white males, removing class 
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distinctions, often while ignoring the restrictions based on race and gender that continued to exist 
until well into the twentieth century.  
Over the past several decades, many historians have drifted away from political and legal 
history, especially the history of political institutions, and as such, there has not been a great deal 
of recent scholarship examining state constitutions. This thesis helps to fill that void, but it does 
so in a way that is different from previous work in the field.  By examining the underlying 
political and social contexts, and by identifying the key historical actors at each constitutional 
convention, this thesis presents a more complete picture of state constitutional revision, 
especially as it relates to the idea of attachment.  Historians have examined the changing nature 
of suffrage laws over time, primarily by analyzing the removal of property restrictions, but this 
thesis is unique in its analysis of the variety of ways states redefined attachment, largely due to 
the actions of upwardly mobile non-elite white males.  
Of course, this thesis is not an exhaustive study of the topic.  It is limited to four states 
over a twenty-five year period. It will serve as the framework for future scholarship; I hope to 
build on it by adding more states to increase regional variation and to extend the time period to 
determine whether these new ways of defining attachment changed over the course of the 
nineteenth century.  Because of time constraints, this thesis did not exhaustively examine the role 
of partisan politics in nineteenth century constitutional revision or the fascinating relationship 
between slavery, dependency, and attachment.  These are areas of inquiry I would like to develop 
further as I build on and strengthen this thesis, using it as the framework for a subsequent 
dissertation.  
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